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II. TIBET IS RIGHTFULLY AN INDEPENDENT STATE
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The PRC contends that Tibet has been an inalienable part of China since the Yuan Dynasty. Examining this claim requires analyzing events over more than one thousand years while keeping in mind the legal presumption of the continued existence of states:
A State claiming to have established sovereign rights over another State must show convincing proof of the transfer of sovereignty by a consensual transaction or the undisputed and effective exercise of authority for a prolonged period of time.... Furthermore, the presumption in favor of continued statehood prevails over the principle of effectiveness in the case of belligerent occupation. In addition, statehood is not lost when a State has established control over another in contravention of general principles of international law. Thus, acts of illegal intervention, including military aggression and occupation, cannot in themselves cause the extinction of a State.
There is no genuine dispute about the status of Tibet as a state before the thirteenth century. Chinese court historians recognized that by the eighth century, Tibet had become the most powerful nation in Asia, and Tibet actually conquered several Chinese provinces. For example, in 670 Tibetan forces took over four Chinese military garrisons in the Tarim (Kashgar, Khotan, Kucha and Karashar) and then defeated a Chinese army of 100,000 men sent to regain the Tarim. Hostilities continued over the next century, including a failed treaty in 783. In 822, Tibet and China entered into a treaty which 'acknowledged the military stalemate between Tibet and China' and provided, in part:
Now that the two kingdoms have been allied by this great treaty it is necessary that messengers should once again be sent by the old route to maintain communications and carry the exchange of friendly messages regarding the harmonious relations between the Nephew and Uncle. According to the old custom, horses shall be changed at the foot of Chiang Chun pass, the frontier between Tibet and China....
Between the two countries no smoke nor dust shall be seen. There shall be no sudden alarms and the very word 'enemy' shall not be spoken....
This solemn agreement has established a great epoch when Tibetans shall be happy in the land of Tibet and Chinese in the land of China.
The treaty of 822 treated China and Tibet as equals and recognized Tibet as a separate state with its own inviolable territory. 'The terminology of Nephew and Maternal Uncle' was common diplomatic phraseology implying amicable relations as close as family relations, which, while according the Chinese symbolic superiority as Uncle,' did not imply any political dominance of China over Tibet.'
Because Tibet was an independent state as of the early ninth century, when the Chinese Tang Dynasty collapsed, the presumption of its continued existence applies. The claim that '[w]hat view one takes... depends on where one opens the history book,' is legally irrelevant, as is the question posed by the PRC: '[A]t what time has China ever lost its sovereignty over Tibet?' The legally relevant question that must be answered is: 'When and why did Tibet become a part of China?'
After the collapse of the Tang Dynasty, there was no official contact at all between China and Tibet until the appearance of the Mongols in the twelfth century. During the intervening centuries, without interference from China, Tibet developed its lamaist society, which founded the Sakyapa, Kadampa, and Kagyudpa schools of Tibetan Buddhism.
In the thirteenth century, the Mongol Empire expanded to include, separately, Tibet and China. In 1249, the pre-eminent Sakyapa lama, Pandita, was given temporal authority over Tibet by the Mongol Godan Khan; in 1253, he was succeeded by Phagspa, whose secular authority was conferred upon him by Kublai Khan. In 1260, Kublai Khan took control of China, founding the Mongol Yuan Dynasty in 1279. Thus, Tibet and China were separately overrun by the same foreign invader.
Tibet was not part of China before the Mongol conquest, and it became part of the Mongol empire before China was conquered. Tibet was administered by the Mongols separately from their administration of China, under a system established before they conquered China. 'Tibet was administered by Tibetans under the supervision of the Mongol Court... and no Chinese were involved in the administration of Tibet.' On the contrary, 'the Yuan empire was divided into twelve provinces and Tibet was not included in these provinces of the empire.
While the Mongols dominated Tibet, the Mongol Khans and the Tibetan lamas developed a relationship known as cho-yon. Usually translated lama-patron or priest-patron, cho-yon is a unique Buddhist and Central Asian institution that cannot be categorized under current international legal terms. The Tibetans and Mongolians claim that this relationship was the core of Mongol-Tibetan relations, whereas the PRC contends that it was secondary to the incorporation of Tibet into Mongol China. The constitutive elements of the lama-patron relationship are the patron's commitment to protect the lama and the lama's commitment to fulfill the patron's spiritual needs, and its most important aspect is reciprocal legitimation of authority: The Mongol Khans conferred temporal authority over Tibet on the Tibetan lamas, and the Tibetan lamas' religious mandate conferred legitimacy on the Mongol Khans' Imperial rule. The separate administration of Tibet within the Mongol Empire, and the unique and uniquely personal cho-yon relationship between the Mongol rulers and the Tibetan lamas, thus provide no support for the claim that the Chinese asserted sovereignty over Tibet during the Yuan Dynasty.
In 1349, Changchub Gyaltsen overthrow the Sakyapa hierarchs, broke away from the Mongol Empire, and established Tibet's 'Second Kingdom,' a secular regime in which Tibet's lamas did not rule. The new Tibetan ruler established himself not merely without Mongol assistance, but at the expense of the very Sakyapa hierarchs whose authority the Mongols were bound to protect. Moreover, he firmly established himself as ruler of Tibet almost two decades before the Chinese won their independence from the Mongols and established their own Ming Dynasty in 1368. Thus, Tibet's subordination to the Mongol Empire, which had begun decades before the Mongol subjugation of China, ended before the Mongols lost control of China. Recognizing that the collapse of the Mongol Empire restored to China and to Tibet the independence that each had enjoyed before the Mongol conquest, 'the first Ming emperor referred to Tibet as a foreign state, in language that was unequivocal.'
The PRC claims that the Ming Dynasty exercised effective sovereignty over Tibet primarily by granting titles to various Tibetan lamas and officials. The granting of titles, though, was merely part of a system of diplomatic and economic relations that China maintained or attempted to establish with neighboring countries, and, indeed, the Ming emperors gave complimentary titles to anyone who wanted them. The titles conferred by the Ming Emperor were not effective grants of power. On the contrary, the Ming Emperors handed out the title 'King' to many religious leaders simultaneously, with no apparent expectation that any of them would actually rule Tibet. As a result, the Ming Dynasty's policy of bestowing honorary titles on various heads of religious orders did not affect the succession of secular rulers who actually wielded power in Tibet. Despite Chinese claims, Ming patronage of Tibetan lamas and their award of titles and non-existent official positions is hardly the equivalent of actual Ming authority over Tibet or evidence that Tibet was a part of China during the Ming Dynasty.
Moreover, extinction of Tibetan statehood would require the undisputed and effective exercise of authority by an outside state, in this case Ming China, for a prolonged period of time. The secular Phagmodru regime founded by Changchub Gyaltsen in 1349 was succeeded by the Rinpung Dynasty in 1481, which was in turn succeeded by the Kings of Tsang in 1565. Each of these changes of power was attended by a struggle, and there were numerous other conflicts among religious and secular groups throughout the period. Although this was a period of great political upheaval in Tibet, Tibetans remained firmly in control of their own country and the Ming emperors of China played no part in the successive changes in government.
Nor did the Ming Dynasty influence the selection and powers of the Dalai Lamas, who would later take temporal control of Tibet from the secular Second Kingdom. In 1578, the Mongol ruler Altan Khan conferred upon Sonam Gyatso (H.H. the III Dalai Lama), and posthumously upon his predecessors, the title 'Dalai Lama' (meaning 'ocean lama' or 'ocean of wisdom' in Mongolian). Sonam Gyatso was later invited by the Ming Emperor to the Ming Court, but he declined to go. Yonten Gyatso (H.H. the IV Dalai Lama) likewise declined an invitation from the Ming Emperor to bless a Buddhist temple in Nanking.
The institution of the Dalai Lamas was therefore a creation of the Tibetans and Mongols, not the Chinese. The Dalai Lamas, moreover, did not view themselves as subjects of the Ming Emperors.
The secular monarchs of Tibet's Second Kingdom ruled Tibet until 1642, when the Mongol Gusri Khan overthrew King Karma Ten-Kyong with the backing of the Gelukpa hierarchs and united Tibet under the Fifth Dalai Lama. The Fifth Dalai Lama had in 1638 bestowed the title of 'Dharma King' (Tenzin Choskyi Gyalpo) on Gusri Khan as a reward for his service. The Khan, in return, recognized the supreme rule of the Dalai Lama to whom he was bound by a cho-yon relationship. Thus, after Gusri Khan installed the Fifth Dalai Lama as ruler with 'temporal authority over all of Tibet,' the Khan 'received the title of King of Tibet, but retired to the Kokonor with his armies.'
The PRC argues that in 1653 the Qing emperor made Gusri Khan the supreme political chieftain of Tibet, but Gusri Khan had already been 'Dharma King' of Tibet since 1642. The PRC also argues that the Emperor Shunzhi of the Qing Dynasty conferred the Fifth Dalai Lama's title upon him. The Fifth Dalai Lama's authority, however, derived from the overthrow of the Second Kingdom by the Mongol Khan, which was a fait accompli when the Qing Dynasty was founded.
Gusri Khan continued as 'Dharma King' (a primarily military function) until his death in 1655. After his death, the Fifth Dalai Lama assumed complete control of temporal affairs in Tibet and ruled without any outside interference. Also, despite the presence of the so-called 'kings' of Tibet, putative successors to Gusri Khan, the Dalai Lamas wielded all the actual power, and the 'Dharma Kings' served under the Dalai Lamas. Thus, a Jesuit living in Tibet early in the eighteenth century said of the Seventh Dalai Lama and his government: 'The hierarchy existing in Thibet is not secular but superior to all temporal and regular government. Head of all is the Grand Lama of Thibet.... He rules not only over religious, but over temporal matters, as he is really the absolute master of all Thibet.' A more succinct description of the effective exercise of sovereignty can scarcely be imagined.
The cho-yon relationship was established between the Dalai Lamas of Tibet and the Manchu Emperors in 1639, well before the latter conquered China and while the secular monarchs of the Second Kingdom still ruled Tibet. It was a personal spiritual relationship between them with 'no formal role for a Tibetan Lama at the Manchu Court.' This did not change when the Manchus conquered China and established the Qing Dynasty to rule their new 'Chinese empire.' As already noted, the primary obligation of the Manchu Emperors in the cho-yon relationship was the protection of the Dalai Lama, his 'Church' and country. Qing troops entered Tibet four times for that declared purpose 'in 1720 to drive out the invading Dzungar Mongols and to escort the newly discovered seventh Dalai Lama to the Tibetan capital; in 1728 and 1751 to restore order after civil wars; and in 1792 to meet the Gorkha invasion. Each time this was in response to appeals from Tibet under the Cho-Yon relationship, the initiative resting with the Tibetan [government].'
After the first of these offerings of protective services, the Qing Emperor explicitly invoked his duty of protection. The successive interventions, though, did result in an increase in Qing administrative control over Tibetan affairs until in 1792 the Qing temporarily restricted Tibetan autonomy in both domestic and foreign affairs. In the Imperial Edict of 1793, the Ambans, Imperial representatives at Lhasa, were given increased authority, and the Qing asserted a right to control the search for reincarnations of high lamas.
The measures undertaken in the wake of the 1792 intervention represent the height of Qing influence in Tibet but fall far short of establishing Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. The most important reason for this is that the nature of the Qing relationship with Tibet remained one between an empire and a semi-autonomous peripheral state, not a relationship between a central government and an outlying province. Thus, the Tibetan State, though dominated to some extent by the Manchu Imperium, continued to exist. Tibet was not conquered or annexed by the Emperor and the formal source of government remained in Tibet in an at best protectorate relationship with the Manchu. Because the extent of actual interference was limited and by no means continuous, and Tibet continued to possess the essential attributes of statehood, the State of Tibet never ceased to exist. Although Tibet became for a relatively short period of time a dependent state of the Qing empire, Tibet did not thereby become a part of China; Tibet remained a distinct nation.
Another reason that the changes instituted in 1792-1793 did not establish Chinese, or even Manchu, sovereignty over Tibet is that the Tibetans ignored those provisions of the Emperor's unilateral Edict with which they did not agree. Among other things, the Edict required that the incarnations of the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama, and other high lamas be chosen under the supervision of the Ambans through a system of choosing of lots from a golden urn. This was intended to symbolize that final authority over the selection of reincarnations, and thus over political succession in the Tibetan system, belonged to the Qing Emperors as the sovereign power in Tibet. The symbolism was soon overwhelmed by the reality, however, as only twelve years later, on the first occasion the Tibetans had for selecting a new Dalai Lama (the Ninth), the Tibetans ignored the Edict and chose the Ninth Dalai Lama in the traditional manner.
The Edict's lottery system was used for subsequent selections of Dalai Lamas only sporadically. The Tenth Dalai Lama was determined by traditional Tibetan methods; however, the Ambans insisted that it be announced that the lottery system had been used, so that the Qing could claim authority over the selection of the Dalai Lama while the Tibetans were satisfied that he had actually been chosen by traditional methods. The Eleventh Dalai Lama was 'confirmed, apparently by the use of the Ch'ing lottery.' The Twelfth Dalai Lama likewise 'was selected by the Tibetan method but was confirmed by means of the lottery.' In his case, however, the use of the lottery was a complete sham, because 'the name of the same boy was on all three slips of paper put into the golden urn.' The Thirteenth Dalai Lama was confirmed in 1879 without the use of the lottery system.
A third reason that the changes instituted in 1792-1793 did not establish Chinese, or even Manchu, sovereignty over Tibet is that the provisions of the Imperial Edict of 1793 were actually voluntary. The PRC asserts that the Imperial Edict of 1793 conferred powers upon the Ambans through which China exercised sovereignty over Tibet. The General who presented the decree to the Eighth Dalai Lama, however, did so as a set of suggested regulations for Tibet's protection, openly declaring that Tibet was free to accept or reject the Emperor's suggestions as it pleased:
Similar instances did occur and, indeed, the Qing Emperors had nothing to do with them. The Qing Emperors provided no military assistance at all in Tibet's wars with the Dogras of Jammu (1841-1842), the Gorkhas of Nepal (1855-1856), and British India (1903-1904). In 1841 the Dogra rulers of Mannu and Kashmir invaded western Tibet in an attempt to capture the lucrative pashim trade but the Tibetans repelled the Dogras without any assistance from the Qing. The war ended with a peace treaty signed by the Dogra and Tibetan plenipotentiaries in September 1842. Later, the PRC admitted that China had not participated in treaty of 1842. When the Gorkhas of Nepal invaded Tibet in 1854, the Qing Emperor did not assist Tibet and that war was also concluded by a treaty signed in 1856 by Nepalese and Tibetan plenipotentiaries in Kathmandu. Under that treaty, Nepal exacted a form of tribute from Tibet and assumed protection over it, replacing the Manchus to some extent. Notably, when Kalon Shatra established a new government in Tibet in 1862, he looked to the Nepalese Court for official recognition, not to Beijing. By the middle of the nineteenth century, therefore, the Qing Empire did not exercise effective control over Tibet, even to the limited extent of securing its borders. The Qing Emperor's abdication of his role as protector of the Dalai Lama, moreover, effectively ended the cho-yon relationship.
A further reason that the changes made in 1792-1793 did not establish Manchu, let alone Chinese, sovereignty over Tibet is that soon thereafter, the Amban became little more than a foreign ambassador in Lhasa. The Regent who ruled Tibet from 1819 to 1844 was able to rule without interference from the Ambans, and by the middle of the nineteenth century the Tibetans neither sought nor followed the Ambans' advice. The Manchus retained little influence in Tibet, and many in Lhasa and Kathmandu favored their expulsion from the region. Even the Ambans themselves acknowledged their lack of authority. For example, Amban Yu Tai stated in 1903 that 'he was only a guest in Lhasa not a master and he could not put aside the real masters, and as such he had no force to speak of.''
The Qing Dynasty's abandonment of its patronage of the Dalai Lamas was formalized in 1910. The Manchu Emperor Hsuan T'ung officially denounced the supposed object of his devotion, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, 'taking away' the title conferred by him on the Tibetan sovereign in an effort to 'depose' him. The Tibetan government responded that the Emperor 'never conquered Tibet or gave it to the Dalai Lama. Titles given by the Emperor to the Dalai Lama are complimentary; the Dalai Lama's power and position does not depend on them.... The deposing of the Dalai Lama is as if the Dalai Lama would try to depose the Emperor by withholding the usual title of Celestial Emperor Manjushri Incarnate of China [which is conferred on him by the Dalai Lama].''
The Manchu Qing Empire was overthrown by the Chinese nationalist revolution of 1911. The Tibetan government soon thereafter accepted the surrender of the imperial troops that remained in Tibet, as well as Chinese troops that had entered Tibet two years earlier from Sichuan, and repatriated them to China with the mediation of the Nepalese Ambassador in Lhasa. A 'Three Point Agreement' to that effect was signed on 12 August 1912, and a second agreement on 14 December. The Dalai Lama declared any links that might still have existed with the Empire to have ended, and he reaffirmed Tibet's independence.
From 1911 until the arrival of Chinese troops in Lhasa in 1951, Tibet exercised effective control over its territory and engaged in international relations, the specific aspects of which have already been discussed. The last Qing Emperor had garrisoned troops in Tibet, but the Tibetans formally expelled them in 1911, an unmistakable assertion of national sovereignty, and actually repatriated them in 1912. Moreover, the new Chinese Republic conceded the independence of Tibet. Once established, the Republic of China invited Tibet to 'join' the new republic and thereby acknowledged that Tibet was not as such a part of the Republic. The Republic then sent a mission to announce and explain the Republic and ask Tibet to accept it. The Tibetans Government did not allow that mission even to enter Tibet and the Dalai Lama telegraphed the President that 'the Tibetans do not approve of the Central Government,' and that 'the Tibetans are quite capable of preserving their existence intact and there is no occasion for the President to worry himself at this distance or to be discomposed.' Nonetheless, the President of China unilaterally declared Tibet a province of China. The British Government strongly protested China's action as inconsistent "with the international obligations it had inherited from the Manchus and with the autonomy which [Tibet] had always enjoyed.' The British Ambassador told the Chinese President that Great Britain wanted to see "an autonomous Tibet lying between the territories of Great Britain and China" and made clear that his government did not consider Tibet to be a part of China, a view supported by the fact that the Chinese treaties with foreign powers were not valid in Tibet.
China's subsequent attempts to impose its authority by force in border areas of Eastern Tibet were unsuccessful. The Tibetans repulsed the Chinese advance and in April 1918 forced the Chinese troops to surrender. Tibet and China, with the help of a British consular officer, then negotiated a truce establishing a Sino-Tibetan boundary between the Yangtze and the Mekong but Beijing never ratified the agreement. The British Government, in the face of China's refusal to negotiate matters pertaining to Tibet, announced its intent to deal with Tibet independently of China:
With that communication, the British government determined to recognize and treat Tibet as a fully autonomous State and to deal with it separately from China. China, in contrast, continued to assert authority over Tibet but the facts on the ground belied that assertion. For example, between 1918 and 1931, China made military threats along the Sino-Tibetan border, and Tibet and China exchanged charges of border violations. Open fighting finally broke out in 1931 and resulted in Tibetan territorial gains. The fighting ended in a truce in November 1931, under which Tibet retained control of all areas it occupied and China paid Tibet an indemnity. The parties subsequently amended the agreement in 1932 and 1933, however, to reinstitute the boundaries agreed to in 1918.
On 17 December 1933, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama died. From 1933 until 1947, Britain maintained a permanent diplomatic mission in Lhasa, treating Tibet as a sovereign state. Independent India then maintained its diplomatic mission in Lhasa until the Chinese invasion. The PRC, in contrast, was not permitted the same freedom of presence in Tibet. The head of the British Mission noted: 'Unlike those of us in the British Mission, the Chinese in Lhasa were not permitted to travel freely outside the city. When members of their mission wanted to enter Tibet by way of India, they had to get permission from the Tibetan government to do so.' During these years, Tibet continued to defend its borders. For example, the Communist 'Long March' retreat entered eastern Tibet in 1934, and the Tibetans drove the Maoist forces out of Kham in 1936.
Tibetan representatives did attend Chinese Parliamentary sessions in 1946 and 1948, but they were there to observe, not to take part. There is no evidence that they either did or were empowered to accede to any actions taken by those bodies. Indeed, the leader of the Tibetan delegation expressly affirmed that they had not recognized or signed the new Chinese constitution adopted by the Chinese assemblies. On the contrary, the Tibetan delegates attended these 'Constitutional Assemblies' for the purpose of presenting to the Chinese Government Tibet's proposals for their future relations.
While the Tibetan delegation was in India, British officials warned the representatives, in what turned out to be a prophetic admonition, that their attendance at the Chinese assembly could be construed as implying that Tibet accepted Chinese sovereignty. Although the delegation had instructions to attend only as observers, the Chinese convinced the Tibetans that the Constitutional Assembly would discuss Tibet's situation and the Tibetans agreed to participate in order to put forward Tibet's case. The Tibetan representatives had been deceived:
At the next Constitutional Assembly, in 1948, delegates from the Tibetan mission in Nanking attended but they similarly did not recognize or sign the resolution of the assembly. When Mao Dzedong's Communist revolutionaries came to power in 1949, Tibet expelled all the members of the Chinese Mission in Lhasa.
Thus, when the PLA entered Tibet in 1950, Tibet was a fully functioning state. Indeed, the International Commission of Jurists concluded that:
(On to II.D, The Tibetan Government-in-Exile Is The Only Legitimate Government Of Tibet -->)
Once the existence of a State is established, there is a strong presumption in favor of its continuation. To establish a loss of independence is, consequently, to overcome a formidable burden of proof. This presumption follows from the central position of independence and sovereignty in the system of international law, created and maintained by sovereign States for their protection. Any restrictions on a State's independence can be accepted only with strong and unequivocal evidence and must be interpreted restrictively. In the absence of such evidence, full independence must be presumed; hence the burden of proof is on the party claiming the existence of restrictions.
1. Tibet Was Indisputably Independent Before The Thirteenth Century
Tibet and China shall abide by the frontiers of which they are now in occupation. All to the east is the country of Great China; and all to the west is, without question, the country of Great Tibet. Henceforth on neither side shall there be waging of war nor seizing of territory....
2. Tibet Did Not Become Part of China During The Mongol Yuan Dynasty
[T]he Mongols were and are a race distinct from the Chinese; and their empire was a Mongol empire, not a Chinese empire.... [N]orthern and southern China did become parts of this Mongol empire after their conquest in 1271 and 1279, respectively. But these conquests, and the submission of the Chinese to the Mongols, never turned the empire into a Chinese one, as China claims today. In fact, the Chinese finally overthrew the Mongol emperor Toghon Timur Kham and drove him and his army out of China and back to Mongolia in 1368, reclaiming the independence of China and establishing a Chinese empire under the Ming dynasty. China can hardly claim credit for the conquests of the Mongols in Europe or Asia.
3. Tibet Was Not Part Of China During Tibet's 'Second Kingdom'
4. Relations Between The Dalai Lamas Of Tibet And The Manchu Qing Dynasty Do Not Show That Tibet Was Part Of China
[I]f the Tibetans insist on clinging to their age-old habits, the Emperor will withdraw the Ambans and the garrison after the troops are pulled out. Moreover, if similar instances [i.e. to the Gorkha invasion of 1792] occur in the future, the Emperor will have nothing to do with them. The Tibetans may, therefore, decide for themselves as to what is in their favour and what is not or what is heavy and what light and make a choice on their own.
5. Tibet Was Not Part Of China During China's Nationalist Period
We regard ourselves as at liberty to deal with Tibet, if necessary, without again referring to China; to enter into closer relations with the Tibetans; to send an officer to Lhasa from time to time to consult the Tibetan Government; to open up increased trading intercourse between India and Tibet; and to give the Tibetans any reasonable assistance they might require in the development and protection of their country.
The Tsongdu [Tibetan National Assembly] demanded that the Chinese in Tibet should be subject to the laws of Tibet, and that they should apply for entry visas for Tibet; the Chinese Government should conduct its diplomatic correspondence with Tibet through the Tibetan mission at Nanking; Tibetan representatives to China would carry Tibetan Government credentials, and no others should be accepted by China as official representatives of Tibet. The Tsongdu promised to maintain friendly relations with other countries and to negotiate and protect Tibet's frontier. If any country should attack Tibet, however, Tibet should be able to call upon China to come to Tibet's assistance.
[T]he Chinese Constitutional Assembly did not address the Tibetan issue except to assert that 'all of the peoples whose delegates are present in this Assembly are subjects of the Chinese Kuomintang Government.' The Tibetan delegation found that it had been tricked into participating in an entirely Chinese governmental affair as representatives of Tibet. The Chinese never mentioned the Tibetans' letter nor their request to negotiate Tibet's status, nor did they ever reply to the letter nor agree to any negotiations. However, the Chinese press fully publicized the presence of the Tibetan delegation, conveying the impression of official Tibetan participation in the Chinese Constitutional Assembly.
Tibet demonstrated from 1913 to 1950 the conditions of statehood as generally accepted under international law. In 1950 there was a people and a territory, and a government which functioned in that territory, conducting its own domestic affairs free from any outside authority. From 1913-1950 foreign relations of Tibet were conducted exclusively by the Government of Tibet and countries with whom Tibet had foreign relations are shown by official documents to have treated Tibet in practice as an independent state.
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